Greg Detre
Friday, 03 May, 2002
based on Sarah Waldron�s notes
whether a particular F is a good F depends radically on what we substitute for �F�
natural goodness = goodness of an individual living thing
general thesis: moral judgement of human actions and dispositions is one example of a genre of evaluation itself actually characterised by the fact that its objects are living things
the
fact that a human action/disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be
simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing???
subjectivist, non-cognitivist theories are based on a mistake
distinction between descriptive/evaluative language
� making any sincere moral judgment requires the presence of individual,
attitude or intention, and thus goes beyond description/assertion of fact
description cannot reach all the way to moral
judgement � for moral judgement, something �conative� has to be present as well
as belief in matters of fact
distinction between fact + value:
propositions about mattters of fact are assertible if their truth conditions are fulfilled, ut moral judgement, through conditions of utterance, are essentially linked to an individual speaker�s subjective state
Foot�s alternative: Hume�s demand is met by the (most un-Humean) thought that acting morally is part of practical rationality
the rationality of, say, telling the truth, keeping promises, or helping a neighbour, is on a par with the rationality of self-preserving action,a nd of the careful + cognizant pursuit of other innocent ends; each being a part or aspect of practical rationality
the different considerations are on a par, in that a judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of the interaction between the ones we call non-moral as well as those which we call moral (e.g. not always rational to keep a promise etc.)
virtues bring it about that one who has them acts well
those who possess virtues possess them in so far as they recognise certain considerations as powerful, and in many circumstances, compelling, reasons for acting
they recognise the reasons and act on them
should not think in terms of rival theories, but of the different parts of practical rationality no one of which should be mistaken for the whole
the root notion is that of the goodness of human beings in respect of their actions; which means goodness of the will, rather than of such things as sight, dexterity or memory
it is wrong to think that an abstract idea of practical reason applicable to all rational beings could take us all the way to anything like our own moral code � the evaluation of human action depends also on essential features of specifically human life
�Aristotelian necessity� = that which is necessary because, and insofar as, good hangs on it
depends on what the particular �life form� of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire
these things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do
facts about human life make it necessary for human beings to be able to bind each other to action through institutions like promising
gives the examples of social animals like wolves in a pack, or bees dancing for each other
there is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself
helps us to see why it is rational to follow morality(???)
on a
practical rationality account, a moral judgement says something about the
action of any individual to whom it applies: namely something about the reason
that there is for him to do it or not do it, whether or not he recognises that,
and whether or not, if he does recognise it, he also acts on it as he should
moreover, it can explain moral action in an individual who knows that he has reason to act morally, because acting on reasons is a basic mode of operation in human beings
do A because want B. want B because of C. C because of etc. � but can't go on forever � tempting to end with some conative element � something the agent just wants
but why should we not take the recognition of a reason for acting as bringing the series to a close(???)
recognition of a reason gives the rational person a goal; and this recognition is according to the argument, based on facts and concepts, not on some prior attitude, feeling or goal
no special explanation is needed of why men take reasonable care of their own future; an explanation is needed when they do not
setting the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of plants and animals
expressivist account will not do in those domains � can't use the word good to express a pro-attitude about nettle roots
features
of plants + animals have what one might call an �autonomous�, �intrinsic�, or
�natural� goodness + defect that may have nothing to do with the needs/wants of
the members of any other species of living thing, and in this they are notably
different from what is found elsewhere in other things in the world
outside(???)
natural goodness = depends directly on the relation of an individual to the �life form� of its species
the evaluation of the parts/characteristics of plants + animals, and of humans, share a basic logical structure + status
judgements of goodness + badness can have, it seems, a special �grammar� when the subject belongs to a living thing
secondary goodness = e.g. the derivative way we can speak of the goodness of soil or weather, as such things are related to plants, to animals or to us
Thompson: to understand certain distinctive ways in which we describe individual organisms, we must recognise the logical dependence of these descriptions on the nature of the species to which the individual belongs
without this reference, �life activities�, such as eating/reproducing, cannot even be identified in an individual
Aristotelian categoricals:
their truth is about a species at a given historical time
it is only the relative stability of at least the most general features of the different species of living things that makes these propositions possible at all
they are subject to change � must take account of subspecies adapted to local conditions
relation between Aristotelian categorical and the evaluative assessment is very close indeed
if S�s are F, and S1 is not F it is defective
the evaluative assessment is the product of propositions of the two logically different kinds
though you need to make another link � teleological element
what is crucial to all teleological proposition is the expectation of an answer to the question, �what part does it play in the life cycle of the species?�, i.e. �what is its function?� or �what good does it do?�
we start from the Aristotelian categorical � the way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance and reproduction
e.g. the dance of the honey-bee � an individual bee that does not dance does not itself suffer from its delinquency, but ipso facto because it does not dance, there is something wrong with it, because of the part that dancing plays in the life of this species of bee
natural goodness depends on the form of life of the species to which an individual belongs � pliability is good in a reed though a defect in an oak
�goodness� in plants + animals rests in an inter-locking set of general concepts, e.g. species, life, death, reproduction and nourishment, as well as with more local ideas
we have been talking about normative judgements of goodness + defect that would naturally be called �evaluative�
the norms we have been talking about have so far been expliained in terms of facts about things belonging to the natural world
conceptual patterns found in plant + animal world � patterns of natural normativity
identity in the general structure of such explanations throughout the sub-rational world, in spite of the differences appearing in a range of subsidiary concepts
must be a systematic connection between natural goodness + benefit (whether reflexive or other-related)
but benefit does not necessarily follow goodness in every circumstance (e.g. the swiftest deer falling in the hunter�s trap)
the transition to �good� for human beings:
arguing that there is no change in the meaning of �good� between the word as it appears in �good roots� and as its appears in �good dispositions of the human will�
involves a great increase in the number of respects in which evaluation is possible
can characteristics of humans be evaluated in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity we found in the case of plants + animals
a special form of explanation � teleological � to which the idea of function + purpose is related in each case
teleological story for human beings goes beyond a reference to survival itself
the idea of a good life for a human being and the question of its relation to happiness is deeply problematic
the diversity between human individuals/cultures seems to render the schema of natural normativity inapplicable from the start
we could try and characterise human good by starting from the negative idea of human deprivation
e.g. larynx, mental capacity to learn language, powers of imagination, failure of maternal affection etc.
(although you can survive and reproduce without them, you�d be deprived, so they�re natural defects)
possible that the concept of a good human life plays the same part in determining goodness of human characteristics and operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of goodness in plants + animals
�men need virtues as bees need stings� (Geach)
need to be industrious + tenacious of purpose not
only so as to be able to feed, house and clothe themselves, but also to pursue human
ends having to do with love + friendship � how could they have all these things
without virutes such as loyalty, fairness etc. (???)
exchange of goods and children, caring for children after parents� death etc. show how much human good depends on the possibility of one person being able to bind another�s will by something like a promise/contract
thus, to break a promise is, in the absence of special circumstances, to act badly
even if breaking the promise wouldn't harm/annoy anyone, it would still have moral force � because it matters not just what people do but what they are, and so because it matters that people can trust each other, and so disrespect and untrustworthiness are bad human dispositions
in giving a promise one makes use of a special kind of tool invented by humans for the better conduct of their lives, creating an obligation that (although not absolute) contains in its nature an obligation that harmlessness does not annul
i.e. there is no room in the theory of natural normativity for consequentialism
where after all could �good states of affairs� be appealed to in judging the natural goodness/defect in characteristics and operations of plants + animals?
deliberation about best states of affairs may have a place within morality, but not foundationally
to determine what is
goodness and what defect of character disposition and choice, we must consider
what human good is and how human beings live: in other words, what kind of a
living thing a human being is
rationality of doing what virtue demands � do we have reason to aim at these things at
which a good human being must aim, as for e.g. good rather than harm to others?
human beings are rational creatures = able to act on reasons
can be said that while animals go for the good (thing) that they see, human being go for what they see as good
this is why no animal can be said to �know the better and choose the worst�, it makes sense to describe a human as doing this
the problem of akrasia concerns a description applying only to rational beings such as us
human beings not only have the power to reaons about all sorts of things in a speculative way, but also the power to see grounds for acting in one way rather than the other
Davidson�s
distinction between:
1.
what
N should do relative to a certain consideration, e.g.:
a.
I
should go out, because I need to get this money to the bank
b.
but
I should stay in because I need to nurse my cold
2.
what
N should do �all things considered� (a.t.c.)
(a) + (b) are not contradictory
the special characteristic of an a.t.c. or final �should� is its conceptual connection with practical rationality (e.g. if you have a temperature of 103� then it is rational to stay in)
i.e. the reasons of anyone who
doesn't f when f-ing is the only rational thing to do are ipso facto defective
to
act in a way contrary to practical rationality is to act irrationally
mistaken attraction of desires + interests as candidates to give practical rationality to moral action
desires + interests are thought to have a special power to explain human action � and cretainly each can be a genuine reason-giving factor � but why not habits, conscience etc.?
Quinn
�neo-Humean� view of practical rationality (???) �
cannot in consistency with ourselves think that the
Humean account is true(???)
how to show the rationality of acting, even against desires + self-interest, on a demand of morality
see goodness as setting a necessary condition of practical rationality and therefore at least a part-determinant of the thing-itself
direction of argument: goodness � reasons
why should I do that which a good person must do?
have to show/explain that someone who doesn't (e.g. doesn't keep promises) would be acting badly
conceptual connection between acting well and acting rationally � that is why there is reason for acting as the good person would
if he asks again for a reason, it is no longer clear what he is asking for � to ask for a reason for acting rationally is to ask for a reason where reasons must a priori have come to an end
when we speak of �a good S� � if an animal we are thinking about it as a whole, but if a human being � concerned with his rational will
reasons don�t divide into �moral� and �non-moral� reasons (e.g. being kept in bed by the flu, bound by a promise etc.)
features common to �moral� (other-regarding) and
self-regarding evaluation � may be labelled �evaluations of the rational human
will� (???)
moral have as their subject not mental or physical abilities, but voluntary action and purpose (i.e. of the rational will), e.g. someone who falls on a mountain and kills someone is not a murderer
lack of knowledge may �take away something of voluntariness� but does not always excuse
goodness/badness can come from different formal features of a single action:
goodness can come from the nature of the action itself, from what it is that is done, e.g. saving a life, murder
end for which an action is done
the agent�s judgement of whether he is acting badly or well, e.g. going against conscience, doing what one thinks one shouldn't
but these aren't reason to think moral evaluations should be treated differently from other relations concerning the human will
in a clash between �moral� and �non-moral� evaluation, the former will trump the latter
need to recognise as virtues of the will (�volitional excellences�) self-regarding virtues like hope and a readiness to accept good things for oneself
conversely, the kind of timidity, conventionality and wilful self-abnegation that may spoil no-one�s life but one�s own are �moral faults�
wrong to look for an independent criterion of practical rationality to which goodness in action must somehow be shown to conform � instead, rational choice should be seen as an aspect of human goodness, standing at the heart of the virtues rather than out there on its own
objection to her view of practical rationality: what if practical rationality is the pursuit, and nothing but the pursuit of happiness
if vice is �a form of natural defect� and virtue is goodness of the will, where does happiness fit in?
the problem for morality about the relation between virtue + happiness comes from the idea that happiness is man�s good, together with the though that happiness may be successfully pursued through evil action
happiness as:
absence of restlessness, or discontent
of enjoyment, pleasure, liking doing that
of achieving, or perhaps what will be achieved
gladness (unclockable), a sense of things being well, conscious of the good things in one�s life
happy frame of mind, i.e. cheerful, confident, ready for enjoyment and apt to have a sense of things being well
good life vs happy life?
joy is of the essence of a good life, but is of
course compatible with prolonged suffering
e.g. Wittgenstein�s famous death-bed insistence that he had had a wonderful life
when we talk about a happiness that is supposed to be humanity�s good, we cannot intend pleasure/contentment alone
e.g. the kindest of fathers would not choose a
lobotomy for his child that would leave them perfectly happy all day picking up
leaves
Aristotle: we should not wish to continue in the
pleasures of childhood at the cost of remaining a child
Foot argues that happiness does not have the same logical grammar as e.g. excitement or elation
we tend to think that happiness has to have the dimension of depth � but what is depth?
that which causes disturbance in our lives? no
that which matters on our death-bed? no[1]
we are tempted to think of deep happiness as explicable psychologically in a way that makes it possible to separate if from its objects � but why should this be possible?
possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life
we should be suspicious of the idea that whenever we speak of happiness we are speaking of a state of mind which seems as detachable from beliefs about special objects
as e.g. having a headache or a tune running through one�s head
this picture should be shaken up by realising the impossibility of attributing a grown-up�s deep happines to a young child
Foot says that something important must still be missing because this does not yet say anything decisive against the conjunction of even the greatest, deepest happiness with wickedness
go back to thinking about plants + animals:
relationship between goodness/defect in an individual and what counts as flourishing for a member of the species to which it belongs
to flourish is here to instantiate the life form of that species, and to know whether an individual is/not as it should be, one must know the life form of the species
indeed, there may be an unwelcome whiff of philosophy even in speaking of human �Good� � there is nothing wrong with giving a word/expression a special meaning in philosophy, but then its meaning must really be made clear, otherwise an obtruding picture may lead us to invent a logical grammar in a way that will likely foul up the debate
let us ask what it is to benefit a living thing, as this seems, after all, to be the same as doing something that is for its good
would it be right to say that those whose behaviour made the Wests� abuse + murder possible benefited the horrible Wests?
Foot says that our natural refusal to say so highlights a hidden conceptual truth � that happiness is inseparable from virtue
gives the example of the brave men who died defying the Nazis � but for the dreadful times they lived in, most of these men might have had especially happy lives � they knowingly sacrificed their happiness in making their choice
but at the same time, there is a sense in which they did not sacrifice their happiness in refusing to go along with the Nazis
in the abstract, what they longed for (to get back to their families) was wholly good, but as they were placed it was impossible to pursue this end by just + honourable means � happiness in life, was not really possible for them
the
suggestion then, is that humanity�s good can be thought of as happiness, and
yet in such a way that combining it with wickedness is a priori ruled out
Aristotle: insisted that thte life of one who could be counted as eudaimon required favourable external circumstances
happiness is a protean concept
McDowell: �happiness� is close to Aristotle�s eudaimonia in that operation in conformity with the virtues belongs to its meaning
Foot: happiness is here understood as the enjoyment of good things, that is, attaining + pursuing right ends
but she doesn't agree with him in identifying happiness with a life of virtue, or saying that a loss incurred through virtuous action is no loss at all � he seems to her to allow too little for the genuine tragedy that there may be in moral choice (what Wiggins terms McDowell�s �rigorism�)
Nietzsche said that he was attacking the premises of morality � what are they?
Plato, books I + II of the Republic:
Thrasymachus:
justice (the just actions of just men) serves the interests of the stronger (ruthless individuals prepared to swindle honest men)
the self-inflicted injury of the just and their obedience are not virtue but silly good nature
Glaucon:
justice is better because of the virtues that society attaches to it (i.e. because we can't get away with injustice) � on the other hand, someone with a magic ring of invisibility who refrained from plunder would not be admired but rather seen as the most foolish of men
he wants Socrates to show that justice is one of those good things desired for what they are in themselves as well as just for their consequences (like thought, sight and health, rather than gymnastic exercises or medical treatment)
Socrates:
happiness lies in harmony in the soul, health rather than disorder there
Foot:
wants to question what it means to talk about justice in itself as it is in the soul
consider analogy: how would friendship appear to visiting Martians?
friendship might appear to be a nuisance institution that all but the rich + powerful rely on, but can't afford to do without � it might seem that, in itself, acting as a friend is disagreeable, but it suits one�s ends ultimately
they might think that, were it possible to get the rewards by gaining the reputation of being a friend without really accepting its duties, that is what any human would seek
Foot�s point is that these Martians would be failing to understand what friendship actually is in human life � a Thrasymachean view of friendship would instantly be recognised as wrong
it is what they are missing in this account that we mean when we talk about what friendship is in the human mind + heart
same with a Thrasymachean view of maternal affection etc.
there is a way in which a loving parent does not really separate their from their children�s good
Foot thinks it is wrong to think
that this is just because one will affect the other
of course we don't mean by saying that justice is �in the soul�, that we pay debts, keep promises and refrain from stealing etc. out of love
Aristotle was surely right to distinguish what the just man does from doing it as the just man does, i.e. in terms of the underlying thoughts, feeling and attitudes of one who recognise the claim of any human being to a certain kind of respect, i.e. a lover of justice (just as you can have a lover of truth)
Nietzsche three theses, attacking the �morality of pity�, but also �morality� itself:
1. free will
2. attack on specifically Christian morality
3. denying �intrinsic badness� (of actions???)
Nietzsche:
free will is simply an illusion � attacking the idea of a pure substance standing outside nature but nevertheless intervening to cause actions in the world (cf Kant�s noumenal self)
he saw such a metaphysic of the self as necessary to the idea of moral responsibility and the morality of desert � to sweep them away would be to destroy the kind of judging (blaming) that seemed to him to be the essence of morality and to show a detestable love of retribution
but Foot wants to leave this attack
aside because Nietzsche would also have to show (in his attack on free will) that
no other distinction between voluntary + involuntary action (e.g. Aristotle�s)
would do instead
Nietzsche:
attacking a �pity morality�, i.e. the Christian �herd morality�, of the weak + inferior who, while secretly cruel + (above all) resentful, performed acts of �kindness� with which they would demean the receipient and bolster up their own self-esteem
�he says that we do kindnesses to others so as to make them think well of us, then buy back this good opinion to soothe our self-hatred� (pg 106)
meanwhile, above all, we ourselves are resentful of our need to accept morality�s control � like Callicles (in Plato�s Gorgias), human beings are tamed by morality and, like tamed animals, reduced by it
he represents human good in terms of individuality, spontaneity, daring and a kind of creativity that rejects the idea of a rule of life that would be valid for others as well
Nietzsche is denying exactly the connection with human good that was earlier said to give a character trait that status
pity, at the core of Christianity, is a kind of sickness, harmful to pitied and pitier alike
but does one really have to see a morality that stresses the humanness of sympathy (e.g. Hume�s) as mistaken/expressing a twisted sense of inferiority?
story of the old priest, who, asked if he had
learned anything about human beings in his many years of hearing confessions,
first said �no�, but then �yes. there are no grown-ups.�
even if we �acknowledge the greedy, jealous, small child that is ever with us, and yet insist that genuine kindness exists � if so, by the criteria of natural normativity, charity is a prime candidate as a virtue, because love and other forms of kindness are needed by every one of us when misfortune strikes, and may be a sign of strength rather than weakness in those who show pity
�we
may reasonably think, moreover, that charity makes for happiness in the one who
has it, as hardness does not�
�we are now, of course, in an area in which philosophy can claim no special voice: facts about human life are in question and so no philosopher has a special right to speak�
what about Nietzsche�s �revaluation of all values�?
what does this mean - by what standards do we revalue them? can the revaluation itself be revalued?
he was saying that something (e.g. pity) thought to be good is not really good, i.e. denying the proposition that �to pity others is to have a good disposition towards them�, and so is challenging a judgement about what I have called natural goodness and defect in the human species
she considers a procedure by which we (re-)evaluate a characteristic/operation:
in the case of the dancing of the honey bees, it plays a beneficial role in the life of the hive � but if it turned out that it was not a means for leading other bees to a source of nectar, and it also played no part in the life of the dancer itself, then there would be no merit in a bee�s dancing and no �natural defect� in an individual bee just because it did not dance
she considers how we have revalued old beliefs about the baneful influence of (e.g.) masturbation and homosexuality
if we take these as examples of revaluing values, we can look at Nietzsche�s attack on Christian values more or less on his own terms
he asked whether pity was good either for the one pitying or for the one being pitied, and this was the right question to ask
his treatment of the topic was all mixed up with gratuitous contempt for the kind of human beings he saw as inferiors, and some pretty strange ideas about the resentment and hidden malice of those who accept conventional moral restraints
she argues that though there is something to Nietzsche�s perceptive depth psychology (see the old priest story), not everyone is like this, and he goes OTT
also, she distinguishes between pity, and compassion (which is respectful and good)
i.e. he got his facts wrong, but if his facts had been right, his revaluation of pity would have been right as well
he moved to a different + more sinister point of view, in denying the �intrinsic badness� of any kind of act:
�To talk of intrinsic right + wrong is absolutely nonsensical: intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, in as much as life is essentially � something which functions by injuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilitating, and is absolutely incomprehensible without such a character� (Genealogy of morals, 2nd essay, section 11)
Nietzsche �illicitly� identifies features of the plant + animal worlds with human acts of injury/oppression
his most deeply rooted thought about the goodness/badness of human actions was based on a �psychological individualism� or �personalism�:
he thought profoundly mistaken a taxonomy that classified actions as the doing of this or that, insisting that the true nature of an action depended rather on the nature of the individual who did it
a denial of the intrinsic badness of kinds of actions may like just a belief that there are no kinds of actions (however horrific) that could not in extreme circumstances be justified by a pressing end
Nietzsche: right + wrong in action can not be determined by what was done except in so far as that stood in a certain relation to the particular nature of the person who performed it
Nietzsche is often described as an immoralist
e.g.:
he castigated some types of individuals as cruel monsters or licentious beasts
indulgent of �pranksome� nobles� acts of plunder, murder and rape
but he was ready to endorse more or less moral judgements on types of human beings
e.g.
urging the cultivation of a body of strong but controlled + disciplined passions
virtues, e.g. courage + integrity
vices, e.g. malice + inauthenticity
he considered the �affects� of cruelty + lust (the dark passions??? pg 111) to be necessary for transformation to a higher being
the tree that has to grow with its roots in the mud
Foot: his crucial was about what consituted a good life for a human being, i.e. his idea of human good (creativity, self-confidence, lightness of spirit, daring etc.)
he spoke with special scorn of the idea of �good and evil the same for all�
Foot:
his theoretical psychology consisted largely of a constellation of drives, reducible to a WTP � he introduced the notion of �depth psychology�, but unempirically, and failed to fill it out properly
his substantive WTP doctrines (of �injury�, �oppression�, �annihilation� etc.) seem totally mistaken (with no sound basis in psychology), and poisonous
Mann (1947): �How bound in time, how theoretical too, how inexperienced does Nietzsche�s romanticising about wickedness appear � today! We have to learned to know it in all its miserableness�
they go directly against the principles of natural normativity, because there�s nothing that human beings need more than protection from those who would do them harm and oppress them
the norms by which we live (especially those we teach to children) have to be largley formulated in terms of the prohibition of actions (e.g. murder, theft)
�In human life, it is an Aristotelian necessity
(something on which our way of life depends) that if, for instance, a strange
should ocme on us when we are sleeping he will not think it right to kill us or
appropriate the tools that we need for the next day�s work. In human life as it
is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in
the one who does it�
we can admit special circumstances without getting anywhere near Nietzsche�s denial of the intrinsic rightness/wrongness of kinds of actions
Foot thinks that �it is only for a different species that Nietzsche�s most radical revaluation of values could be valid � it is not valid for us as we are, or are ever likely to be�
where does all this leave substantial moral questions?
in a way, nothing is settled, but everything is left as it was
the account of vice as a natural defect merely gives a framework within which disputes are said to take place
�moral philosophy has to do with the conceptual form of certain judgements about human beings, which cover a large range of human activities�
considerations of a �form of goodness� common to all living things does not affect how we treat plants + animals except �within the usually distinctions of virtues + vices
we cannot say �x is good� without saying what type of thing �x� is, what its function is, what its good for
subjectivism in morality is the thought that grounds alone are not enough to determine what is right, but that there has to be something subjective (mental, e.g. intention, emotion) extra, e.g. in emotivism
(see �Oxford Today Features Trinity 2001 On virtue and its rewards.htm�)
�'The theme of the book', says Professor Foot, 'is that the evaluation of people's actions is of the same kind, logically, as the evaluation of parts and features of plants, such as the roots of trees or the colour and scent of flowers, considered in relation to the life of individuals of that species.'�
can I get away from thinking of natural normativity exclusively in terms of adaptiveness???
�The mainstream view in moral philosophy is that there are two quite separate classes of meaning: descriptive meaning, which deals with facts, and evaluative meaning, which deals with qualities such as good and bad. Professor Foot argues that in the case of living things - plants, animals and humans - evaluations simply state a special class of fact. Natural goodness can apply as well to physical parts of living beings as to their actions: to say that a tree has good roots, in her analysis, is logically the same as to say that a person performs a good deed. The underlying logic has to do with the assumption that good roots or good actions are those that are necessary in the lives of individuals of that species.�
�necessary� � necessary for what??? survival??? happiness??? how can you tell/define necessary for a species, except in adaptive terms???
�The
later chapters of the book explore the relationship between human virtue and
human happiness.�
�Being
involved with [Oxfam], she says now, has made her 'very happy'. The link
between virtue and happiness may, as she admits in her book, be difficult to
establish in every case, but it certainly seems to be true in hers.�
so in what (respects is Nietzsche) an immoralist???
o free will
lack of free will undermines an institution based on allocating responsibility (primarily blame)
detested the notion of �punishment� � see �pity� below
o anti-objectivity, �good and evil the same for all�
no divine law-giver, no rational/moral world order
revaluation of all values (though Foot seems to think this is largely a singular attack on the Christian herd morality, I think it�s a more general, subjectivist statement)
o anti-Christian/pity morality
depth psychology � seeing the self-serving behind the altruistic-seeming
�he says that we do kindnesses to others so as to make them think well of us, then buy back this good opinion to soothe our self-hatred� (pg 106)
WTP: various generally unsavoury �moral� pronouncements, e.g. pranksomeness of rape + murder
o no intrinsic badness of actions:
�the true nature of an action depended rather on the nature of the individual who did it� (what she terms his �psychological individualism� or �personalism�)
child-like + weak (fawning over Oskar)
died with dignity?
double standards/inconsistent
protecting his maid
he could be bought
started becoming a little magnanimous towards the end (pardons etc.)?
he did seem to believe his own rhetoric about the Jews, and that what they were doing was right/good
but he did also seem just to be enjoying the power trip without any rationale but resentment towards their success, manifesting itself as a petty lashing-out when given a whip with impunity
conation /k<schwa>"neI<longs>(<schwa>)n/ n.E17. [L conatio(n-), f. conat- pa. ppl stem of conari endeavour: see -ATION.]<unknown>1 An attempt, an endeavour. Only in E17. 2 Philos. The desire to perform an action; volition; (a) voluntary or purposive action. M19. conative /"kQn<schwa>tIv, "k<schwa>U-/ n. & a. <unknown>(a) n. (rare) an endeavour, striving; (b) adj. of, pertaining to, or characteristic of conation: L17.
by placing morality on the same level as all practical rationality, isn't Foot reducing morality away???
�the evaluation of the parts/characteristics of plants + animals, and of humans, share a basic logical structure + status� - what basic logical structure??? how does she avoid the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. adaptive = good) etc.???
modern ethical philosophy appears to have fallen between two stools � on the one hand we accept that some sort of broad, character-based ethics is necessary, of which morality only comprises a small part, but we are unable to agree substantively, conclusively, objectively, on what that sort of life we should lead, i.e. what sort of person we should be, and whether there is a single answer � we are unable to progress from �good roots� to �good dispositions of the human will� in a smooth fashion, without leaving gaps for subjective preferences about what sort of life is good, and we are unable to enrich our notion sufficiently from the plant/animal vegetative/nourishment/adaptive �good� to a moral good that tells us how to be in a world of less scarce resources
�need to be industrious + tenacious of purpose not only so as to be able to feed, house and clothe themselves, but also to pursue human ends having to do with love + friendship� � but doesn't this beg the question about things like love and friendship being human ends???
how do you specify a life form of a species (even a simple, relatively heterogenous animal species) � she seems committed to something more than just an �evolutionary story� (pg 92)???
protean /"pr<schwa>UtI<schwa>n, pr<schwa>U"ti:<schwa>n/ a. & n. Also P-.L16. [f. PROTEUS + -AN.]A adj. 1 Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of the sea-god Proteus of classical mythology; taking or existing in many forms; changing, varying. L16. 2 (Of a theatrical performer) capable of taking several parts in the same piece; gen. versatile. Orig. US. L19.3 Biol. Of animal behaviour: unpredictable, following no obvious pattern. M20.1 E. H. GOMBRICH The dignity of man..lies precisely in his Protean capacity for change.A. S. BYATT I never know what name you�re working under, women these days..are so protean.B n. <unknown>1 An inconstant or equivocal person. rare. Only in L16.2 A theatrical performer who takes several parts in the same piece. Orig. US. L19.proteanism n. capacity for change; changeableness, variability: M20.proteanly adv. (rare) L17.
�the suggestion then, is that humanity�s good can be thought of as happiness, and yet in such a way that combining it with wickedness is a priori ruled out� � the philosopher idealist in me wants to believe and uphold this truth, but I just don't entirely buy it � the Nazi-defiers were sacrificing their happiness, though it is true that there was no other way that they could be happy� oh, now I�m confused again � perhaps that was the closest they could come to living a happy life in those circumstances like Foot says � I would like to believe it, but it just feels too convenient
�a Thrasymachean view of friendship would instantly be recognised as wrong� � yes, but doesn't that show where her analogy between justice + friendship breaks down � we know that friendship consists of more than that, but we are a lot less intuitively certain about justice being the same
is Foot effectively accepting that morality is humanly-subjective???
what�s Aristotle�s distinction between voluntary + involuntary action that helps with Nietzsche�s attack on free will???
is Foot thinking partly in terms of universalisability when she talks of natural normativity???
I don't think that Foot�s procedure of revaluation is what Nietzsche meant at all � he was talking about a more subjective (probably) non-rational revaluation� I don't know whether that means she can dismiss him, or whether she plans to deal with this subjectivism or elimination of badness in the next section???
�Nietzsche�s substantive WTP doctrines (of �injury�, �oppression�, �annihilation� etc.) seem totally mistaken (with no sound basis in psychology), and poisonous � they go directly against the principles of natural normativity, because there�s nothing that human beings need more than protection from those who would do them harm and oppress them� � how does Foot square her idealised, traditionally-moral �principles of natural normativity� with the fact that most evolutionary explanations of morality (in terms of adaptiveness, and the species etc.) are based on reciprocity etc.???
I feel that for morality to have a truly �moral� quality, it needs to have a sense of �because it�s right�, that is, not for any further reason, not subjectivisable, not because it�s for the good of the species etc.(???)
is it necessarily a problem for all virtue ethics that they�re relativistic???
presumably a virtue ethics for rational/sentient beings in general might not be � or would it still be relativistic, to some degree???
does it also perhaps stem from their emphasis on acting as the good man does, not what he does (because it might seem that this does not preclude securely enough certain kinds of horrific acts being �as the good man would do� given certain circumstances�???)???
virtue ethics vs virtue theory???
presumably the �life form� (or whatever) of humanity is in some part a reaction/reflection of our environment � so do the human virtues change over time/culture???
[1] �William Pitt the Younger�s last words may have been �Oh my country, how I leave my country!� but in a different report, �I think I could eat one of Bellamy�s veal pies.�� Foot, pg 87